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Abstract 
 
 
Objective: 2009 H1N1 influenza was first detected in the Northern Hemisphere in April 2009.  
National data have suggested that the novel influenza virus disproportionately causes severe 
illness in children and young adults, a somewhat different presentation from traditional seasonal 
flu which normally strikes hardest in the very young and older adults. This may or may not be 
the case in Virginia, which, if it is different, may suggest a need to alter flu prevention messages 
and vaccine policy as the outbreak continues through the fall 2009-10 influenza season. This 
report examined the early presentation of the new influenza virus in Virginia, compared with the 
seasonal flu presentation. 
Methods: Surveillance data of influenza-like illness (ILI) visits to hospital emergency 
departments and urgent care centers for the period Oct. 2008 to Aug. 2009 were obtained from 
the Virginia Department of Health. The period from Oct. 2008-March 2009 was considered to be 
the normal flu season, while April-Aug. 2009 was considered as the 2009 (novel) H1N1 flu 
season. Descriptive statistics looked for differences by age, region and sex with respect to the 
proportion of visits that were for influenza-like illness compared to all reported illness for the 
normal and H1N1 flu seasons. Chi square and p-values were used to assess the level and 
significance of differences between flu seasons. 
Results: While the 2009 H1N1 influenza was a novel virus that, like all influenza viruses, could 
mutate and change into a form causing more severe illness, during the early months of the 
epidemic/pandemic, the virus did not appear to cause more illness as a percent of all illness 
compared to the preceding months of influenza in Virginia. Though it was unexpected to have 
influenza-like illness in the amount seen during April-August 2009, with several exceptions the 
level of flu-like illness compared to all illness was not higher than during the normal flu season 
immediately preceding the appearance of the 2009 H1N1 influenza. 
Conclusion: During the early months of the novel influenza H1N1 epidemic/pandemic in 
Virginia, the novel influenza virus caused levels of illness that were lower than levels of illness 
seen during the preceding normal flu season. Further study that examines the novel influenza 
virus through the end of the 2009-10 season may help to quantify the impact of the new virus. 
Flu-like illness reports spiked, for instance, as schools and colleges returned for fall 2009 
semesters. 
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Introduction  
Background 
 Novel influenza A/H1N1 2009, also called pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza and 
informally ―swine flu,‖ was first detected in the Northern Hemisphere in April 2009. 1 In a 
matter of weeks the virus, facilitated by the ease of international travel, spread across the 
globe.
2,3
  The World Health Organization on June 11, 2009 declared the start of a worldwide 
outbreak of influenza – a flu pandemic. 4 In the subsequent months, the world faced the threat of 
a novel version of an unpredictable virus that initially presented with seemingly mixed virulence 
– mild as the initial cases appeared in the United States, or more deadly, 5 as was suggested by 
the experience in Mexico where an April 23 report suggested that a cluster of cases in Mexico 
City sickened 120 people and killed 13. 
6
 Only time would tell. 
 Newspaper reports identified the index case as Maria Adela Gutierrez, 39, a mother and 
wife who worked as a door-to-door census-taker in Oaxaca, in Oaxaca state in southern Mexico.
7
 
Gutierrez became ill in early April and was initially diagnosed with a throat infection. Even 
though ill, she continued to work. As she continued to work, it‘s estimated she came in contact 
with as many as 100 to 300 people until ceasing to work just prior to the Easter holiday break. 
7,
 
8
 
 Gutierrez‘s condition worsened and she was admitted to a hospital on or around April 8. 
Early lab tests suggested she had a coronavirus, the type of highly contagious virus implicated in 
the 2003 outbreak of severe acquired respiratory syndrome (SARS) that sparked international 
concern. 
9
 At the hospital where Gutierrez was treated, health officials began taking infection 
control actions. Later tests indicated it was not a coronavirus, but something equally 
disconcerting. She died April 13. Tests determined Gutierrez died from complications caused by 
a never-before-seen strain of a swine-origin influenza A. Hospital and local health officials 
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began to take measures to identify people who might have been exposed. In the interim, a local 
newspaper had learned of unusual infection control procedures taking place at the hospital and 
sent reporters to investigate. 
9
 On April 16, health officials went public with their concerns. 
Those media reports of the situation at the state-run Dr. Aurelio Valdivieso General Hospital 
came to the attention of the World Health Organization. 
 On April 17, 2009, the World Health Organization requested verification of a report 
of a case of an atypical pneumonia in Oaxaca. 
1
 Two days later, April 19, the WHO notified 
Mexico of similar cases occurring in California. 
1
 The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention on April 21, 2009 issued an MMWR Early Release edition that described two cases it 
had learned of on April 17 of two children, sick with fever, who appeared to be infected with a 
novel strain of an swine influenza A (H1N1) virus that had not been seen before in humans or 
swine. 
10
 That report said: 
Although this is not a new subtype of influenza A in humans, concern exists that this new 
strain of swine influenza A (H1N1) is substantially different from human influenza A 
(H1N1) viruses, that a large proportion of the population might be susceptible to infection, 
and that the seasonal influenza vaccine H1N1 strain might not provide protection. The lack 
of known exposure to pigs in the two cases increases the possibility that human-to-human 
transmission of this new influenza virus has occurred.  
 
 Normally the federal public health agency receives reports of 1 to 2 cases a year of 
humans infected with a swine-origin influenza. Between 2005 and 2009 there were 11 such cases 
reported, but there were probably more that went undetected and unreported. 
3
 Historically, 
swine-origin influenza has been the subject of a significant amount of scholarly research. It‘s 
transmission to humans, particularly farm workers and their families had been studied by 
Christopher W. Olsen et al., whose 2002 research examined infection in farm workers and their 
families 
11
, and by Gregory C. Gray et al. who asked ―Pandemic Influenza Planning: Shouldn‘t  
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Swine and Poultry Workers Be Included?‖ 12 Scholars have raised concerns about the role of 
swine viruses as potential factors in a pandemic influenza. 
13
 
 As reports surfaced the index of suspicion was raised, and more suspected cases were 
reported. First references to the cases on ProMed, an internationally distributed and publicly 
available listserv run by the International Society for Infectious Diseases, were on April 24, 
according to the ProMed archives. 
14
 The listserv, available on the Internet, presented a translated 
version of a story in the April 23 edition of the Mexican newspaper El Manana that quoted an 
official of a union of health workers saying as many as 500 health sector workers were ill with 
influenza. Also, that day‘s mailing list forum includes a submission about Canadian health 
authorities on April 23, 2009 issuing an alert to doctors and hospitals to be on alert for patients 
with unusual flu-like symptoms whose history includes recent travel to Mexico. 
14
 In subsequent 
days, some countries would ban travel to Mexico, cruise lines canceled stops in Mexico, and 
some countries banned pork imports. 
15
 
 By June 11, 2009 when the WHO declared that a pandemic had started, the novel 
influenza A virus had been reported in 74 countries with at least 30,000 people sickened. 
1,
 
4,
 
16
 
 Global surveillance and epidemiological investigation suggested the never-before-
seen spread rapidly but to be similar to a seasonal flu in terms of morbidity. 
17
 Over the next 
months the novel virus would prove itself to be very different in other ways from seasonal flu – 
affecting the young more than older populations and continuing to infect and spread during the 
warm months in the Northern Hemisphere. 
17
 Those were ominous signs, bringing to mind the 
flu pandemic of 1918 that killed at estimated 21 million-50 million worldwide. 
18
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Influenza in historical context 
 
 Influenza, commonly referred to as ―flu,‖ is a respiratory viral infection that affects 
humans, birds, pigs and other animals. 
19
 Some researchers suggest that some of the earliest 
historical descriptions of influenza are in the pre-Christian era.  Dobson and Carper write that 
―Hippocrates (460-377 B.C.) was probably the first person to record diseases with enough 
precision for them to be identified today as malaria, mumps, diphtheria, tuberculosis, and 
perhaps influenza.‖ 20 
 Influenza infection typically causes respiratory illness with symptoms of cough, 
sneezing, sore throat, fever and muscle aches. 
21
  Flu viruses continuously circulate in humans, 
birds, pigs, horses and other animals. Pigs have been called flu ―mixing vessels‖ because they 
can be infected with human, avian (bird) and swine flu viruses.  Those viruses can mix together 
and create new flu strains. 
22
 
 The 2009 H1N1 influenza virus appears to be a mix of existing swine flu viruses, 
including a strain that has genetic pieces of swine, bird and human flu viruses. 
23,
 
24  
Because the 
swine flu virus genes were identified first, it was labeled a swine influenza. The novel H1N1 
virus, however, was not known to be circulating in pigs in the United States at and around the 
time it was identified. 
25
 However in May 2009, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency said it 
had found the new virus in a swine herd in Alberta, suspecting the herd was exposed by a 
Canadian who had traveled to Mexico. 
26
 
 Person-to-person virus transmission in humans is typically from exposure to virus-
containing droplets expelled when a person coughs or sneezes.
21
 Influenza virus, some reports 
suggest, can survive for 24 hours on plastic or metal surfaces, 
27
 so that a person does not 
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necessarily have to be in close contact with an ill person to be exposed when virus is left on 
surfaces. 
 Vaccination, antiviral drugs and nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) are the 
methods of reducing disease and transmission. 
28
 NP infection control methods that have been 
proven to reduce spread of infection include isolating sick persons away from others (isolation) 
and frequent hand washing to remove viral particles picked up from contact with contaminated 
surfaces (hand hygiene).
29  
In some instances, quarantine – keeping people who have been 
exposed but who have not yet displayed symptoms – has been used. To reduce the spread of 
influenza, public health campaigns have emphasized the importance of cough and sneeze 
etiquette, i.e. covering one‘s sneeze or cough with a tissue, and if that is not available, sneezing 
into one‘s sleeve. Those practices reduce droplet contamination of surfaces, which has been 
shown to have merit in reducing spread of respiratory infections. 
30,
 
31
 In addition, methods such 
as social distancing (closing schools and canceling events to reduce personal contacts) and 
wearing face masks also have a role in preventing virus transmission in certain circumstances. 
28
 
 Annually in the United States, seasonal flu and flu complications kill an estimated 
36,000 people. 
32
 Globally, it‘s more difficult to estimate influenza morbidity and mortality 
because many developing countries do not have laboratory capability needed to do testing. 
33
 
However, the World Health Organization estimates that annual seasonal flu epidemics 
worldwide ―result in about three to five million cases of severe illness, and about 250,000 to 
500,000 deaths.‖ 34 
 In modern times, documented worldwide flu outbreaks or pandemics include a 1957–
1958 ―Asian flu, a 1968 ―‗Hong Kong flu,‖ a 1977 ―Russian flu‖ and the most notorious of them 
all, 1918 ―Spanish flu‖ pandemic. 5, 35 Of those, the 1918 flu pandemic was the most deadly, a 
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pandemic of astronomical proportions the likes of which have not been seen since. People all 
over the world succumbed. Globally, it is believed as many as 21 million to 50 million died.  
 ―The 1918–1920 H1N1Spanish Flu, which killed 40 million people worldwide is 
informative as a ‗worst case scenario‘ for a flu pandemic,‖ writes Derek Gatherer in the Journal 
of Clinical Virology. 
35
 
 In the 1999 book Flu, science writer Gina Kolata writes: 
―Estimates range from 20 million to more than 100 million, but the true number can 
never be known. Many places that were bludgeoned by the flu did not keep mortality 
statistics, and even in countries such as the United States, efforts at tabulating the 
deaths were complicated by the fact that there was no definitive test in those days to 
show that a person actually had the flu.‖ (page 7) 
 
 Taubenberger, Hultin and Morens describe the historical efforts to decipher the 1918 
virus, including efforts that took researchers to Alaska in 1951 to retrieve tissues samples from 
long-ago flu victims buried in the Alaskan permafrost, which also served to preserve the tissues, 
and to afterwards try to grow the virus. Those efforts did not yield answers. Many years later, 
however, with improved technology that offered capabilities to analyze genetic material, 
scientists undertook a nine-year effort to complete the genetic coding sequence of the 1918 
virus.
36
 Tissues samples include formalin-fixed, paraffin-embedded (FFPE) autopsy tissues 
retrieved from a collection of the National Tissue Repository of the Armed Forces Institute of 
Pathology and samples recovered from another Alaskan expedition. 
The efforts, described in a 2007 paper, conclude that: 
Viral sequence data now suggest that the entire 1918 virus was novel to humans in, or 
shortly before, 1918, and that it was not likely to have been a reassortant virus such as 
those that caused the 1957 and 1968 pandemics. Rather, the 1918 virus is an avian-
influenza-like virus that appears to have been derived in toto from an unknown source 
because its eight genome segments differ from contemporary avian influenza genes, 
especially at synonymous sites. 
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More recently, Morens, Taubenberger and Fauci write that the ―novel H1N1 virus associated 
with the ongoing 2009 pandemic is a fourth-generation descendant of the 1918 virus.‖ The 
authors, which include the director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases at 
the National Institutes of Health, Dr. Anthony  S. Fauci, add later that ―The 1918 influenza virus 
and its progeny, and the human immunity developed in response to them, have for nearly a 
century evolved in an elaborate dance; the partners have remained linked and in step, even as 
each strives to take the lead.‖ Their description suggests what experts are referencing when they 
state that influenza is unpredictable. 
 Indeed, it is influenza‘s unpredictability that makes it difficult to gauge preemptively 
how a flu season will unfold. The terms drift and shift describe influenza changes. 
37 
Drifts are 
more subtle changes. They may mean the vaccine developed for a seasonal flu does not offer as 
good protection as what was planned for because the virus changed in the six months it took to 
produce a vaccine. Shifts, on the other hand, are significant genetic changes in a viral subtype. 
Viral shifts are what spark pandemics.  
 As the 2009 pandemic continued unexpectedly during the warm summer months 
without retreat, it demonstrated that influenza is unpredictable and raised anew questions about 
prevailing beliefs of the epidemiology of influenza. In 2008, a team of researchers writing in 
Virology Journal described many of the incongruences of influenza, the virus‘s ―bizarre 
epidemiology,‖ as they put it, as described in the body of literature on influenza. Some of the 
questions they attempted to put in context include:  where is the influenza virus between seasons, 
why is the secondary attack rate of influenza so low, why do epidemics end so abruptly, and why 
have influenza deaths in older people not declined despite the increase in vaccination rates? 
38
 
The authors (including a lead author with ties to an agency promoting vitamin D, the so-called 
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sunshine vitamin) suggest there is merit to the theories proposed by R.E. Hope-Simpson, who 
more than two decades ago suggested solar radiation and ―intensely infectious‖ carrier-hosts 
important factors in the simultaneous, seasonal outbreaks of influenza. 
39 
Surveillance 
 
 The propensity of influenza viruses to mutate is one reason for ongoing surveillance. 
When the U. S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the agency ―responsible for 
controlling the introduction and spread of infectious diseases,‖ reported on the first two U.S. 
cases of the 2009 pandemic influenza, there was also this comment that pointed out a level of 
uncertainty about the virus: 
This particular genetic combination of swine influenza virus segments has not been 
recognized previously among swine or human isolates in the United States, or elsewhere 
based on analyses of influenza genomic sequences available on GenBank. Viruses with this 
combination of genes are not known to be circulating among swine in the United States; 
however, no formal national surveillance system exists to determine what viruses are 
prevalent in the U.S. swine population. Recent collaboration between the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture and CDC has led to development of a pilot swine influenza virus surveillance 
program to better understand the epidemiology and ecology of swine influenza virus 
infections in swine and humans. 
10
 
 
 As the epidemic/pandemic unfolded, there was more discussion about surveillance 
going forward. The CDC‘s mission includes ―active surveillance of diseases through 
epidemiologic and laboratory investigations and data collection, analysis, and distribution‖ 40 
 States and some localities are the CDC‘s partners in surveillance. At the Virginia 
Department of Health, the Office of Epidemiology‘s Division of Surveillance and Investigation 
monitors ―for the occurrence of reportable and emerging diseases or suspected outbreaks of 
illness (natural or otherwise), providing recommendations and guidance to prevent the spread of 
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communicable diseases, and investigating outbreaks of disease and other public health 
emergencies.‖ 41  
 For collecting information on influenza, the Division uses several methods: 
laboratory reports, outbreak reports, and data on visits to hospital emergency departments and 
urgent care centers for influenza-like illness (ILI). For a normal flu season, data are collected 
year round, with a typical flu season beginning in October to correspond with the federal 
surveillance timeframe. 
 During the 2007-2008 influenza season, the department used additional methods as 
summarized in the paragraph below taken from a flu season summary: 
For the 2007-2008 influenza season, these data sources included: information on patients 
presenting to hospital emergency departments or urgent care centers with influenza-like-
illness (ILI), laboratory reports of influenza positive specimens, information from 
outbreak investigations, reports of influenza-associated deaths in the pediatric population, 
and data on over-the-counter medication sales. A combination of these data were used to 
determine weekly influenza activity levels, summarize the length and severity of the 
influenza season, and characterize the prevalence of influenza types and strains 
throughout the season. 
42
 
 
 Because the novel influenza A flu season initially represented as an unusual 
extension of the normal flu season into the summer months, surveillance took on an urgency as 
public health officials sought to get data on the virus and its epidemiology. See Appendix A for a 
synopsis of new and existing surveillance methods. 
 The Virginia Department of Health reported the first two cases of novel influenza A 
infections in Virginia on April 30, 2009. 
43
 The patients – an adult male from eastern Virginia 
and an adult female from central Virginia – each had traveled to Mexico. Both had mild illness 
and recovered. On June 2, 2009, the state health department reported the first novel H1N1 death 
in Virginia. 
44
 The patient, an adult female, lived at Southeastern Virginia Training Center, a 
facility for developmentally delayed persons that is operated by the state‘s Department of Mental 
10 
 
Health, Mental Retardation and Substance Abuse Services (The department name changed to the 
Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Services on July 1, 2009). Virginia Health 
Commissioner Karen Remley, M.D., MBA, FAAP,  on April 27, 2009 declared the state to be in 
a public health emergency in order to allow VDH additional means of communicating with 
health care providers as the situation unfolded. On October 24, 2009, President Barack Obama 
declared the H1N1 ―swine flu‖ situation a ―national emergency,‖ a declaration that allows health 
care facilities to develop alternate plans to care for a surge of patients without having to petition 
the federal health agency to do so. 
45,
 
46
 
 
 Objectives 
The project examines data collected in Virginia during the 2008-09 normal flu season 
2008-2009 and a subset of that season, the 2009 novel influenza A season to examine the human 
impact of the novel flu strain and to compare its epidemiological profile across influenza 
seasons.  Data from previous influenza seasons are also included for comparison. National data 
have suggested that the novel influenza A has disproportionately caused severe illness in 
children and young adults, a somewhat different presentation from traditional seasonal flu which 
normally strikes hardest in the very young and older adults. This may or may not be the case in 
Virginia, which, if it is different, may need to alter flu prevention messages, vaccine policy, as 
the outbreak continues through the fall 2009-10 influenza season. 
 The purpose is also to consider influenza surveillance, how it is performed, how it is used 
and what it does and does not tell us. As the pandemic 2009 played out, health officials were 
often asked what would happen next.  Often, the answer was along the lines that influenza is 
unpredictable, that this is what is known to this point, and that this is what we know from past 
influenza seasons. 
11 
 
Methods 
 This is a descriptive study, using data on influenza-like illness and all illness visits to 
health care organizations collected by the Virginia Department of Health through its syndromic 
surveillance program. This project examines surveillance data collected by VDH from October 
2008 through August 2009. The period includes the October through March normal flu season in 
the Mid-Atlantic United States and the period we defined as the 2009 H1N1season--April 2009 
through August 2009 during which the novel pandemic H1N1 influenza A surfaced and 
continued to cause illness throughout the warmer months when influenza typically dies down. In 
the Mid-Atlantic states, cases of influenza normally peak during the period of January to 
February. 
 The Virginia Department of Health Division of Surveillance and Investigation provided 
three Microsoft Excel spreadsheets with data on reports of influenza-like illness (ILI) and all 
visits to health care providers that are part of a syndromic surveillance and sentinel providers 
network for influenza surveillance. The data consisted of spreadsheets with data on: 
●Visits to 24 urgent care outpatient centers and 57 hospital emergency departments in 
Virginia for influenza-like illness from the week ending Oct. 4, 2008 to the week ending Aug. 
29, 2009. Variables included age group (0-4; 5-24; 25-49; 50-64; 65 and older), week of visit, 
gender and geographical region. (Numbers of facilities reporting by geographical region were 19 
in Central, 32 in Eastern, 14 in Northern, 5 in Northwest, and 11 in Southwest. A total of 2,328 
line records were in the database.  
 ● Total visits for all types of illness to 24 urgent care outpatient centers and 57 hospital 
emergency departments from the week ending Oct. 4, 2008 to the week ending Aug. 29, 2009. 
Variables included age group, week, gender and geographical region. This spreadsheet contained 
12 
 
a total of 2630 line records, and because the data were aggregated, there was no identifiable 
patient data. 
 ● Weekly totals for visits to urgent care centers and hospital emergency departments for 
influenza-like visits for the weeks ending October 2008-August 2009. A total of 48 line records 
corresponding to weeks in the reporting time frame. 
 Case definition for ILI is fever along with a cough and/or a sore throat. 
 Because the data were aggregated by age group, there was no information on individual 
patients so approval from university ethics and patient protection committee was not needed. 
Additionally, reports on the epidemiology of previous influenza seasons in Virginia were 
obtained from the VDH Web site. 
 Analysis was done using JMP Statistical Discovery Software, version 8.0.1 and Microsoft 
Excel 2007. The syndromic surveillance data were examined for differences in illness by week 
of visit, age group, region and gender. To test for difference and statistical significance we used 
percent differences, chi square and p-values. Using JMP we calculated there was sufficient 
sample size to detect a statistical difference if there was one.  
As VDH continued to provide surveillance updates during the ongoing 2009-10 influenza 
season on the VDH Web site, some of those general findings are incorporated as indicated.  
 
Results 
 
The overall level of influenza-like illness visits to emergency departments and urgent 
care centers as a percent of all illness was lower during the H1N1 flu season compared to the 
normal flu season  (Table 1). Patients captured in the surveillance network during the normal flu 
13 
 
season were more likely to have complaints of ILI than during the H1N1 flu season. (OR 1.29 , 
95% CI: 1.27,1.31) 
There were noticeable spikes in ILI visits during May and June as H1N1 emerged, but 
peak numbers were below those during normal flu season. (Fig. 1) Stratified by age, sex and 
region, ILI visits were also generally lower during the H1N1 season than normal flu season, and 
the differences between the seasons were statistically significant. (Table 2) An exception to the 
trend of lower illness in the H1N1 season was in the Northern region, where ILI proportion was 
greater during H1N1 season, with that difference deemed statistically significant. (p value = 
0.0000) Fig. 2a and Fig. 2b  show that the Northern region accounted for a larger percentage of 
ILI illness during the H1N1 season than during the normal season. 
Looking at age group differences by region, ILI levels were typically lower during the 
H1N1 flu season compared to normal flu season. (Table 3) The 65 and older age group in 
Central, Northern and Northwestern regions experienced similar levels of illness during both 
seasons. In addition, illness levels were similar between flu seasons in the 0-4 age group in the 
Northern region and in the 25-49 age group in the Northwestern region. Overall, percentage of 
illness accounted for by age groups during each of the flu seasons was similar. (Fig. 3) However, 
the differences shown in Fig. 3 look bigger than the differences reported in Table 2 so are 
probably statistically significant. 
Level of illness was lower overall for both males and females during the H1N1 flu season 
(Table 4), with those levels significantly different from the normal flu season. An exception is 
males aged 65 years or older, where illness levels appear to be similar across flu seasons. 
Looking at regional differences by gender, ILI levels were lower for both sexes in all regions 
except for the Northern region where ILI reports were higher for both males and females in the 
14 
 
H1N1 season compared to the normal flu season. Overall, males and females accounted for 
similar percentages of ILI visits during both flu seasons. (Fig. 4)  
The state also looks at ILI compared to a region specific baseline for ILI--the mean 
percentage of patient visits for ILI during non-influenza weeks for the previous three seasons 
plus two standard deviations. The baseline for Virginia and other south Atlantic states is 2.2 
percent. A chart graphing ILI by week from Oct. 2008 through October 2009, shows percent of 
ILI visits peaked the fourth week of February, there were peaks during the warm months (May 
and June) and by October 2009, percent of illness was at its highest for the previous 12 months, 
with ILI representing about 15 percent of all visits to urgent care centers and hospital emergency 
rooms. (See Appendix B) 
The very large sample size made it more likely that the study would detect differences. 
Discussion 
 
Reports of influenza-like illness were higher during the normal flu season of October 
2008 through March 2009 compared to reports of ILI during the 2009 H1N1 influenza season of 
April-August 2009. However, as a new strain of flu never before seen in humans the 2009 H1N1 
influenza virus was cause of significant public health concern worldwide. This study provides an 
early look at the presentation of H1N1 season in Virginia, stratifying results by age group, region 
and gender. ILI activity was present during warmer months (April-August 2009) when influenza 
typically dies down. Levels of ILI were frequently above the national seasonal baseline of 
approximately 2.4 percent of all visits during the early 2009 H1N1 flu season. (Fig. 1b) Health 
officials were particularly concerned that the 2009 H1N1 virus was causing more illness in 
younger age groups than what is seen during normal flu season. These results show higher levels 
of ILI visits as a percent of all visits during the normal flu season than during H1N1 season for 
15 
 
all age groups. The results also show that within flu seasons, illness in the 0-4 age group was a 
smaller proportion or all illness during the H1N1 season than during normal flu season, while 
illness in the age groups 5-24 and 25-49 accounted for similar proportions of ILI within the 
normal and 2009 H1N1 flu seasons. 
Prior to and in response to the novel H1N1 influenza A virus, public health officials 
added/included other surveillance methods to get a complete picture of influenza in the 
Commonwealth. Appendix A shows VDH surveillance methods and lists federally recommended 
surveillance methods, including some new efforts added as a result of the pandemic threat.  
These results offer an early snapshot of 2009 H1N1 in Virginia, but conclusions to be 
drawn from the data are limited by several factors. First, we looked at ILI reports for April-
August 2009 as the 2009 H1N1 season, while later reports show illness levels rising significantly 
several months after our study period ended.  
Another major limitation of this study is the case definition for influenza-like illness is 
perhaps overly broad, and may capture other illness that is not influenza but that has similar 
symptoms.  Australian researchers, for instance, found fever, cough and fatigue to be a better 
identifier of flu cases. 
47
 In the British Medical Journal, a clinician asks the question ―Is the case 
definition too loose,‖ pointing out that of the throat swabs taken from a group of 20 patients 
labeled as having 2009 H1N1 flu, only two tested positive.
48
  ILI data, however, are not meant to 
identify every person with influenza because it is widely understood that many people who are 
sick self-treat and do not seek medical care. Rather, according to VDH, surveillance is used to 
monitor changes in flu activity from week to week. There is no precise way to know for certain 
how much ILI is in a community. However, that raises the question of whether there is need for 
spot checking or audits of ILI reports to get estimates of the accuracy of ILI reports. 
16 
 
Other agencies trying to track influenza note similar limitations in surveillance methods. 
A surveillance effort of the American College Health Association is tracking influenza at 
colleges and universities. According to ACHA data, attack rates reached 20 percent at some 
universities by mid-October. 
49 
(See Appendix D)  However, the researchers note the limitations 
of the surveillance data, including that it represents only those institutions that participate in the 
surveillance program.     
Influenza testing limitations add to the dilemma of quantifying level of illness in a 
community. It is neither practical nor cost effective to test every person sick with a fever, cough 
and sore throat.  In addition, rapid tests for the H1N1 virus that are available in urgent care 
centers and hospital emergency departments are not the best predictors of influenza. A Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention review found rapid tests to have a sensitivity of 40%-69%. 
50
 
That report, which looked at cases in outbreaks in schools in Connecticut,  found that the rapid 
tests correctly identified less than half the cases confirmed by viral culture and real-time reverse 
transcription--polymerase chain reaction (rRT-PCR) as H1N1 influenza. Other research found 
similar shortcomings of the tests. Writing in the journal, Clinical Infectious Diseases, Vasoo et 
al. found the sensitivities of three rapid influenza antigen tests for H1N1 ―low to moderate,‖ 
specifically they noted the following tests had the sensitivity indicated: BD Directigen EZ Flu 
A+B test (Becton Dickinson), 46.7%; BinaxNOW Influenza A&B (Inverness Medical), 38.3%; 
QuickVue Influenza A+B Test (Quidel), 53.3%. 
51
   
That said, surveillance is continuously evolving in new and creative ways. Some of the 
more atypical efforts to track flu outbreaks have consisted of collecting data on purchases of 
over-the-counter cold medications and monitoring ambulance calls. 
52-55
  In addition, enterprising 
efforts have sought to identify outbreaks before they become available by conventional 
17 
 
surveillance methods through tracking how often people search for the terms influenza, cough, 
fever, etc. using Web-based search engines. Hulth et al. analyze such efforts with the premise 
that conventional surveillance methods that rely on sick people seeking care have limitations.  
Methods that rely on hospital and other provider data, the Swedish researchers note, ―demand 
that the cases seek medical care, and there may be an over-representation of groups that are 
vulnerable for severe disease in the reporting.‖ 56 In addition, the authors state that during a 
pandemic, like the one occurring as this paper is written, ―There is also a risk that the sentinel 
system collapses during a pandemic, since the health care staff will be overloaded with patient 
care.‖ Their study suggested Web-query data can provide a 7-10 day advance notice of flu 
outbreaks ahead of the traditional methods.  
U.S. and other researchers have also explored the validity of Web search engines as a 
surveillance tool. 
57-60
 According to Carneiro et al., Google Flu Trends is unique and innovative 
technology that ―takes us one step closer to true real-time outbreak surveillance.‖ 57  Eysenbach 
presenting at a symposium in 2006 noted that there is a correlation between numbers of clicks on 
key words in Google with epidemiological data from the flu season 2004/2005 in Canada .
61  
In 
fact, concluded Eysenbach,  the Google method ―proved to be more timely, more accurate and… 
considerably cheaper than the traditional method of reports on influenza-like illnesses observed 
in clinics by sentinel physicians.‖ Google Flu Trends expanded to 14 countries in Europe on 
October 8, 2009. 
58
 
 The ongoing need for surveillance is evident. Experts have in recent years suggested that 
the world was overdue for an influenza pandemic based on the cyclical nature of worldwide flu 
outbreaks. 
62
 Surveillance provides a way to identify possible pandemic strains early, and  
perhaps get a head start on preparing a counterattack. That has not always been possible. 
18 
 
Tognotti describes the first documented worldwide influenza outbreak as perhaps occurring in 
1580, originating in Asia and described by observers as like a ―wind illness‖ because of how 
quickly and easily it spread. 
63 
  
―Since the last pandemic nearly 40 years ago, we have observed dramatic changes in 
social and ecological factors thought to facilitate emergence of a pandemic-capable strain,‖ noted 
Mills et al. in 2006. 
64  
Whether a pandemic virus would emerge from a swine or avian influenza 
strain was uncertain. The 1976-77 ―swine flu‖ affair that caused an outbreak in recruits stationed 
at Fort Dix, New Jersey, described by Gaydos, 
65 
 raised the profile of swine-origin influenza 
viruses as possible pandemic strains.  Writing in the journal Virus Research in 2002, Christopher 
W. Olsen noted that for many years H1N1 influenza was the predominant type circulating in 
pigs, but in recent decades H3N2, H1N2 and H4N6 subtypes had been identified in pigs. 
22
 Much 
of the international concern, however, seemed to be centered on avian influenza viruses sparking 
the next influenza pandemic. Of specific concerns was the H5N1 avian influenza, a highly 
virulent form that came to public notice in 2004 when it caused deaths in the Asian countries of 
Thailand and Vietnam, wrote researchers summarizing the proceedings of a global workshop on 
pandemic preparedness. 
66 
 The report‘s authors note: 
―The past decade has seen increasingly frequent and severe outbreaks of highly 
pathogenic avian influenza…The current ongoing epidemic of H5N1 avian influenza in 
Asia is unprecedented in its scale, in its spread, and in the economic losses it has caused.‖ 
 
Internationally, the Global Influenza Surveillance Network (GISN) – consisting of five 
World Health Organization collaborating centres (WHOCC) for reference and research, four 
essential regulatory laboratories (ERLs), and 128 institutions in 99 countries recognized as 
national influenza centres (NICs) – is the primary source for getting a global picture of the 
patterns and behavior of influenza viruses. 
67
 Much of that data is brought together in FluNet, a 
19 
 
Web-based reporting system that allows searching for influenza reports by country, WHO region 
and continent. 
68  
Appendix C contains a sample report, which makes it apparent that flu 
reporting varies by country. 
  
Conclusion 
 
Influenza-like illness is not influenza. Respiratory and other illnesses such as colds, 
respiratory syncytial virus, and strep throat have similar symptoms. Media coverage of the 2009 
influenza pandemic may be driving people to urgent care centers and emergency rooms who 
might in a more normal year take a wait-and-see approach to treating influenza. Flu surveillance 
offers a snapshot of what is happening in the community—tracking ILI, laboratory specimens, 
hospitalizations, deaths and more.  
 Many issues have been highlighted by the 2009 pandemic episode. They include vaccine 
production and policy for patient prioritization, interaction between those doing surveillance of 
influenza in humans and those doing surveillance in animals, influenza testing protocols and the 
case definition of influenza, defining a pandemic, and communicating prevention messages. 
Vaccine production by late October was not meeting projections, adding to the sense of urgency 
and concern with the new-to-humans influenza. As with past flu seasons when there was a 
shortage of vaccine, demand appeared to increase. Currently, most influenza vaccine is produced 
in chicken eggs. That system is time-consuming, and as this episode may or may not show 
eventually, vaccine may not make it to communities in time to prevent peak illness. Ideally, 
vaccine would be produced using cell culture technology and there would be a universal flu 
vaccine that protected against all strains of the virus. 
20 
 
 This study suggests that influenza surveillance systems are better developed in some 
areas of the state, with more reporting from some regions, giving the appearance of more illness 
when one cannot be sure that is, in fact, the case. At this writing, this episode of pandemic flu is 
not over, with months to go before the flu season ends. Much is being written about what needs 
to happen going forward. Globally surveillance programs are needed to more broadly detect what 
some call zoonotic ―hotspots.‖ Mexico was not the place expected to give rise to a pandemic flu 
strain. And there has been criticism that reporting was slow, possibly out of concern for 
economic considerations.  Much of the focus had been on avian flu and Southeast Asia as the 
more likely place for origination of a pandemic virus. Leibler et al., however, suggest domestic 
animal protection farms in many places across the globe create artificial environments ripe for 
creation of new zoonotic pathogens, and they offer that: 
―The importance of early detection cannot be overstated, as the magnitude of 
disease epidemics is exponentially related to the time elapsed between pathogen 
introduction and implementation of control measures. Timely reaction heavily relies on 
early detection and disclosure by those in daily contact with food animals, however, 
current disease control policy tends to discourage this behavior.‖69 
 
Thus, while the need for surveillance to monitor for new pathogens is important to public 
health, the economic risks to growers/farmers can be substantial if something is detected. 
Financial harm to farmers must be considered as a possible deterrent to reporting if surveillance 
programs are to be effective. Throughout the swine flu outbreak the pork industry has had to go 
on the counteroffensive to assure customers that one cannot get swine flu from eating pork.
70 
Similarly, with the avian or bid flu scare several years ago, the poultry industry faced the same 
need to dispel rumors about eating chicken.
71
 
While the term pandemic may suggest something far worse than what is occurring (i.e., 
the 1918 flu pandemic), so far, the virus has remained stable, causing mild to moderate illness.  
21 
 
Kilbourne in 1997 wrote, ―Based on our limited store of unequivocal evidence, we can forecast 
neither the source, the life span, nor the severity of future pandemics. We must be prepared, not 
only for variations on these past themes, but for ones the virus has not yet exhibited. But we must 
be prepared for the worst case, which is a double antigen change combined with increased 
virulence.‖ 72 
Epidemiological surveillance provides data needed to make sound public health decisions 
during an infectious disease outbreak and can also suggest areas where additional research is 
needed before, during and after an episode. The 2009 influenza pandemic has tested the public 
health system, magnifying both strengths and weaknesses of measures to control spread of 
infectious diseases.  
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TABLE 1. Percent of ILI and All visits by normal and H1N1 flu seasons, Oct. 2008-Aug. 
2009, Virginia. 
Flu Season ILI Non-ILI All Visits 
Percent of visits 
for ILI OR 
Normal flu season (Oct. 
2008-March 2009) 33,932 1,441,808 1,475,740 2.30 1.29 
H1N1 flu season (April-
Aug. 2009) 22,864 1,254,606 1277470 1.79 1 
  56,796 2,696,414 2,753,210     
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TABLE 2. Number of visits* for influenza-like illness (ILI)** and all visits by normal (Oct. 2008-March 2009) and H1N1 (April-Aug. 2009) flu 
seasons by age group, sex and region, Virginia. 
      Oct. 2008-March 2009     April 2009-Aug. 2009         
    
 
ILI 
visits 
Non-ILI 
visits 
All 
Visits 
% of Visits 
for ILI 
 
ILI 
visits 
Non-ILI 
visits 
All 
Visits 
% of Visits 
for ILI 
 
chi 
square 
p-
value 
Age 
(yrs) 0-4 
 
7,079 124,698 131,777 (5.37) 
 
4,338 95,170 99,508 (4.36) 
 
123.86 0.0000 
 
5-24 
 
12,507 342,738 355,245 (3.52) 
 
8,603 301,307 309,910 (2.78) 
 
298.71 0.0000 
 
25-49 
 
10,411 539,911 550,322 (1.89) 
 
7,069 478,314 485,383 (1.46) 
 
294.44 0.0000 
 
50-64 
 
2,739 226,308 229,047 (1.20) 
 
2,007 201,707 203,714 (0.99) 
 
44.10 0.0000 
 
65+ 
 
1,196 208,153 209,349 (0.57) 
 
847 178,108 178,955 (0.47) 
 
17.70 0.0000 
               
               Sex Female 
 
18,607 822,464 841,071 (2.21)
 
12,581 708,578 721,159 (1.74)
 
434.16 0.0000
 
Male 
 
15,299 613,347 628,646 (2.43) 
 
10,269 541,114 551,383 (1.86) 
 
452.18 0.0000 
               
               Region Central 
 
9,237 382,262 391,499 (2.36)
 
5,569 323,624 329193 (1.69)
 
396.18 0.0000
 
Eastern 
 
14,654 565,406 580,060 (2.53) 
 
9,186 475,802 484,988 (1.89) 
 
482.47 0.0000 
 
Northern 
 
4,759 241,547 246,306 (1.93) 
 
5,509 232,092 237,601 (2.32) 
 
86.96 0.0000 
 
Northwestern 
 
1,336 115,000 116,336 (1.15) 
 
922 104,511 105,433 (0.87) 
 
41.17 0.0000 
 Southwestern  3,923 137,616 141,539 (2.77)  1,656 118,599 120,255 (1.38)  606.29 0.0000 
               *Visits are those made to hospital emergency departments and urgent care centers that are part of the Virginia Department of Health surveillance network. 
**Case definition of influenza-like illness is a fever with cough and/or sore throat. 
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TABLE 3. Percentage  of visits for influenza-like illness (ILI) and all visits for normal flu 
season (Oct. 2008-March 2009) and H1N1 flu season (April-Aug. 2009),  health region by 
age group, Virginia 
              Oct. 2008-March 2009 April 2009-Aug. 2009     
Region 
Age  
group 
(yrs) ILI All visits 
ILI as 
percent 
of All 
Visits ILI All Visits 
ILI as 
percent 
of All 
Visits chi-square 
*p 
value 
Central 0-4 1,170 25,999 (4.50) 592 17,904 (3.31) 39.214 0.0000 
 
5-24 3,678 93,890 (3.92) 2,234 78,916 (2.83) 153.187 0.0000 
 
25-49 3,349 156,436 (2.14) 2,031 133,303 (1.52) 150.627 0.0000 
 
50-64 786 62,835 (1.25) 533 54,576 (0.98) 19.781 0.0000 
 
65+ 270 52,339 (0.52) 201 44,494 (0.45) 2.043 0.1529 
          Eastern 0-4 2,681 52,575 (5.10) 1,659 38,860 (4.27) 34.063 0.0000 
 
5-24 5,373 145,593 (3.69) 3,537 123,448 (2.87) 175.111 0.0000 
 
25-49 4,750 216,585 (2.19) 2,840 184,195 (1.54) 227.257 0.0000 
 
50-64 1,327 91,799 (1.45) 826 77,965 (1.06) 50.192 0.0000 
 
65+ 524 73,508 (0.71) 324 60,520 (0.54) 16.631 0.0000 
          Northern 0-4 1,776 31,282 (5.68) 1,494 26,997 (5.53) 0.563 0.4530 
 
5-24 1,486 53,878 (2.76) 1,868 54,075 (3.45) 43.475 0.0000 
 
25-49 1,032 89,242 (1.16) 1,510 87,813 (1.72) 99.195 0.0000 
 
50-64 293 36,577 (0.80) 446 36,250 (1.23) 33.405 0.0000 
 
65+ 172 35,327 (0.49) 191 32,486 (0.59) 3.247 0.0715 
          Northwestern 0-4 426 11,335 (3.76) 189 7,735 (2.44) 25.467 0.0000 
 
5-24 469 27,976 (1.68) 322 24,608 (1.31) 11.961 0.0005 
 
25-49 291 40,261 (0.72) 288 37,637 (0.77) 0.474 0.4909 
 
50-64 105 17,187 (0.61) 76 16,854 (0.45) 4.119 0.0424 
 
65+ 45 19,577 (0.23) 37 18,599 (0.20) 0.426 0.5141 
          Southwestern 0-4 1,026 10,586 (9.69) 404 8,032 (5.03) 139.992 0.0000 
 
5-24 1,501 33,908 (4.43) 632 28,863 (2.19) 237.090 0.0000 
 
25-49 989 47,798 (2.07) 400 42,435 (0.94) 188.207 0.0000 
 
50-64 228 20,649 (1.10) 126 18,069 (0.70) 17.606 0.0000 
 65+ 185 28,598 (0.65) 94 22,856 (0.41) 13.078 0.0002 
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TABLE 4. Number and percent of visits for influenza-like illness (ILI) and all visits by normal and 
H1N1 flu season, sex by age group, Virginia. 
   
Oct. 2008-March 2009 
 
April 2009-Aug. 2009 
   
    
 
ILI 
visits 
All 
Visits 
ILI as 
percent 
of all 
Visits 
 
ILI 
Visits 
All 
Visits 
ILI as 
percent 
of all 
Visits 
 chi 
square 
p-
value 
Female Age (yrs) 
           
 
0-4 
 
3,269 60,532 (5.40) 
 
2,014 45,242 (4.45) 
 
49.122 0.0000 
 
5-24 
 
6,786 291,594 (2.33) 
 
4,690 172,804 (2.71) 
 
67.374 0.0000 
 
25-49 
 
6,223 328,284 (1.90) 
 
4,218 284,758 (1.48) 
 
156.384 0.0000 
 
50-64 
 
1,594 128,006 (1.25) 
 
1,193 113,179 (1.05) 
 
21.72 0.0000 
 
65+ 
 
735 122,655 (0.60) 
 
466 105,176 (0.44) 
 
26.352 0.0000 
             
Male Age (yrs) 
           
 
0-4 
 
3,810 71,241 (5.35) 
 
2,324 54,261 (4.28) 
 
75.157 0.0000 
 
5-24 
 
5,721 153,646 (3.72) 
 
3,913 137,097 (2.85) 
 
170.894 0.0000 
 
25-49 
 
4,187 222,016 (1.89) 
 
2,850 200,605 (1.42) 
 
131.286 0.0000 
 
50-64 
 
1,145 101,032 (1.13) 
 
814 90,526 (0.90) 
 
25.854 0.0000 
  65+   436 80,711 (0.54)   368 68,894 (0.53)   0.055 0.8143 
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TABLE 5. Number and percent of visits for influenza-like illness (ILI) and all visits by normal and H1N1 flu season, region by gender, 
Virginia. 
   
Oct. 2008-March 2009 
 
April 2009-Aug. 2009 
   
Region Sex 
 
ILI visits All visits 
ILI as percent 
of All Visits 
 
ILI visits All visits 
ILI as percent 
of All Visits 
 
chi square p-value 
Central Female 
 
5,098 222,691 (2.29) 
 
3,159 185,863 (1.70) 
 
177.9 0.0000 
 
Male 
 
4,136 164,964 (2.51) 
 
2,422 140,275 (1.73) 
 
219.732 0.0000 
             Eastern Female 
 
8,175 339,278 (2.41) 
 
5,197 281,569 (1.85) 
 
232.087 0.0000 
 
Male 
 
6,479 240,745 (2.69) 
 
3,989 203,393 (1.96) 
 
287.834 0.0000 
             Northern Female 
 
2,419 135,432 (1.79) 
 
2,836 129,336 (2.19) 
 
56.223 0.0000 
 
Male 
 
2,340 110,702 (2.11) 
 
2,672 108,114 (2.47) 
 
31.267 0.0000 
             Northwestern Female 
 
705 64,551 (1.09) 
 
480 57,537 (0.83) 
 
21.053 0.0000 
 
Male 
 
631 51,784 (1.22) 
 
442 47,894 (0.92) 
 
20.424 0.0000 
             Southwestern Female 
 
2,210 79119 (2.79) 
 
909 66,854 (1.36) 
 
356.137 0.0000 
 
Male 
 
1,713 60451 (2.83) 
 
744 51,707 (1.44) 
 
253.050 0.0000 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A. Influenza Surveillance: Virginia and the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention  
 
Appendix B. Virginia Department of Health Chart of ILI Oct. 2008-Oct. 2009 
 
Appendix C. Sample FluNet report 
 
Appendix D.  Sample American College Health Association weekly college ILI report 
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 Appendix A. Influenza Surveillance: Virginia and the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention 
 
Method of 
Surveillance 
Virginia Department of Health U.S. Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention 
Influenza-like illness 
counts; chief 
complaint of fever and 
cough, or fever and 
sore throat, or 
mention of the flu 
Automated syndromic surveillance data feeds from 57 
emergency departments, 24 urgent care centers. 
Percent of visits by age group. 
National network of 2,400 providers in 50 states. Each week reports from 
1,300 outpatient providers  on total number of patients seen and total 
with ILI (defined as temperature of 100 degrees F or higher; and cough or 
sore throat in the absence of a known cause other than influenza. 
Percentage of patient visits weighted by state population; this percentage 
compared weekly to national baseline of 2.4 percent. Regional baselines 
vary (Virginia’s is 2.2 percent)  
Influenza-associated 
deaths 
Weekly counts of deaths certificates that mention 
influenza or pneumonia are tracked by location and 
age group 
Vital statistics offices of 122 cities report total number of death certificates 
received and those that mention influenza or pneumonia by age group. An 
increase of 1.645 standard deviations above the seasonal baseline of 
pneumonia and influenza deaths is considered at epidemic level. 
Pediatric influenza-
associated deaths 
Reportable disease by Code Reportable disease since 2004 
Outbreak investigation Routine reminders to facilities to report outbreaks; 
specimens collected an analyzed by state-run DCLS. 
 
Passive surveillance Counts reported by physicians  
Passive laboratory 
surveillance 
Monitor lab-confirmed influenza specimens submitted 
through routine mechanism 
 
School absenteeism 
reports 
Daily counts from schools of enrollment and absences 
of students, faculty, staff 
 
School closure reports Schools report closures on CDC Web site; state can 
access that data 
 
Active laboratory 
surveillance from 
sentinel sites 
Sentinel providers (physicians, emergency 
departments and urgent care centers) asked to 
provide 1 specimen per month per facility; ongoing 
efforts to recruit sentinel physicians 
80 U.S. WHO Collaborating Laboratories and 70 National Respiratory and 
Enteric Virus Surveillance System laboratories, some county public health 
laboratories and some large medical centers reports numbers of 
specimens tested and number positive for influenza A and B. Human 
infection with a novel influenza A virus became a nationally notifiable 
condition in 2007. 
Inpatient hospital Sentinel hospitals provide 5 specimens per month; a 
hospital from each of the five health planning regions 
Emerging Infections Program Influenza Project surveillance for influenza-
related hospitalization in children and adults in 60 counties and 12 Metro 
areas of 10 states (CA, CO, CT, GA, MD, MN, NM, NY, OR, TN). Cases 
identified from hospital admission and laboratory databases and test 
results. Results reported every two weeks during flu season. 
National Respiratory 
and Enteric Virus 
Surveillance System 
  
New Vaccine 
Surveillance Network 
 Hospitals in three counties (one in Ohio, Tennessee and New York) that are 
part of the New Vaccine Surveillance Network provide population-based 
estimates of laboratory-confirmed influenza hospitalization rates of 
children less than 5 years old. 
Geographic  Spread of 
Influenza Summary 
 State health departments report estimated level of flu activity. Levels are 
no activity, sporadic, local, regional and widespread. 
Pneumonia and 
Influenza 
Hospitalization and 
Death Tracking 
 This new system was implemented on August 30, 2009, and replaced  the 
weekly report of laboratory confirmed 2009 H1N1-related hospitalizations 
and deaths that began in April 2009. Jurisdictions report to 
CDC either laboratory confirmed or pneumonia and influenza syndromic-
based counts of 
hospitalizations and deaths resulting from all types or subtypes of 
influenza, not just those from 
2009 H1N1 influenza virus. 
Antigenic  
characterization 
 
 Antigen characterization of influenza viruses began Sept. 1, 2009. 
Antiviral resistance 
testing 
 CDC labs test influenza A (H1N1) virus isolates for resistance to the 
neuraminidase inhibitors (oseltamivir and zanamivir). Additional 
laboratories perform antiviral testing and report their results to CDC. 
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Appendix B.  
http://www.vdh.virginia.gov/epidemiology/DiseasePrevention/H1N1/pdf/10-28-
09Percent_ILI_Age.pdf 
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Appendix C. Sample FluNet report from http://gamapserver.who.int/GlobalAtlas/home.asp 
 
Isolates Informations Report - By Continent 
Summary 
  
Continent Week N°/Year 
Total 
Number of 
Specimens 
Processed 
Total 
Number of 
A(H1) 
Total 
Number of 
A(H3) 
Total Number of 
A Not Subtyped 
Total 
Number 
of B 
Total 
Number 
of Other 
South 
America Whole Selected Period 1376 20 53 5 4 18 
Total Whole Selected Period 1376 20 53 5 4 18 
         
Detail per Country 
  
Continent Country Year 
Total 
Number of 
Specimens 
Processed 
Total 
Number of 
A(H1) 
Total 
Number of 
A(H3) 
Total Number of 
A Not Subtyped 
Total 
Number 
of B 
Total 
Number 
of Other 
South 
America Argentina 2009 210 0 0 0 0 0 
South 
America Bolivia 2009 0 0 0 0 0 0 
South 
America Brazil 2009 732 18 26 5 3 18 
South 
America Chile 2009 0 0 0 0 0 0 
South 
America Colombia 2009 0 0 0 0 0 0 
South 
America Ecuador 2009 0 2 27 0 1 0 
South 
America 
French 
Guiana 2009 0 0 0 0 0 0 
South 
America Guyana 2009 0 0 0 0 0 0 
South 
America Paraguay 2009 0 0 0 0 0 0 
South 
America Peru 2009 434 0 0 0 0 0 
South 
America Suriname 2009 0 0 0 0 0 0 
South 
America Uruguay 2009 0 0 0 0 0 0 
South 
America Venezuela 2009 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  
Detail per Period 
Continent Week N° Year 
Total 
Number of 
Specimens 
Processed 
Total 
Number of 
A(H1) 
Total 
Number of 
A(H3) 
Total Number of 
A Not Subtyped 
Total 
Number 
of B 
Total 
Number 
of Other 
South 
America 21 2009 594 2 9 0 3 1 
South 
America 22 2009 403 8 11 3 0 7 
South 
America 23 2009 202 10 17 2 1 10 
South 
America 24 2009 93 0 14 0 0 0 
South 
America 25 2009 58 0 2 0 0 0 
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Source: American College Health Association. American College Health Association Influenza Like Illnesses (ILI) Surveillance in 
Colleges and Universities Fall 2009: Weekly College ILI cases reported. Linthicum, MD: American College Health Association; 
2009.  www.acha.org/ILI_LatestWeek.cfm#chart_state 
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